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Abstract
Even though deep learning has shown unmatched perfor-
mance on various tasks, neural networks have been shown to
be vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations of the input
that lead to significant performance degradation. In this
work we extend the idea of adding white Gaussian noise to
the network weights and activations during adversarial train-
ing (PNI [7]) to the injection of colored noise for defense
against common white-box and black-box attacks. We show
that our approach outperforms PNI and various previous ap-
proaches in terms of adversarial accuracy on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets. In addition, we provide an extensive
ablation study of the proposed method justifying the chosen
configurations.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have shown a tremendous
success in a variety of applications, including image classifi-
cation and generation, text recognition, machine translation,
playing games, etc. Despite achieving notable performance
on numerous tasks, DNNs appear to be sensitive to small
perturbations of the inputs. Szegedy et al. [20] have shown
that it is possible to exploit this sensitivity to create adversar-
ial examples – visually indistinguishable inputs which are
classified differently. Subsequent studies proposed different
adversarial attacks — techniques for creating adversarial
examples.
One of the first practical attacks is FGSM [6], which
used the appropriately scaled sign of the attacked network’s
gradient. PGD [15], one of the strongest attacks to date, im-
proved FGSM by repeating the gradient step iteratively, i.e.,
∗Equal contribution.
performing projected gradient ascent in the neighbourhood
of the input. C&W [3] used a loss term penalizing large
distances from the orginal input instead of applying hard re-
striction on it. In this way, the resulting attack is unbounded,
i.e., tries to find a minimum norm adversarial example rather
than searching for it in predefined region. DDN [17] signifi-
cantly improved the runtime and performance of C&W by
decoupling optimization of the direction and the norm.
It was noted that it is possible to create adversarial exam-
ples even without access to internals of the model and, in
particular, its gradients, i.e., treating the model as a black
box (as opposed to previously mentioned white box attacks).
The approaches to black box attacks can be roughly divided
into two main classes of approaches: the first class trains
a different model with known gradients to generate adver-
sarial examples and then transfer them to the victim model
[14, 16]. The second class attempts to estimate gradients of
the model numerically, based solely on its inputs and outputs
[4, 11, 18, 21].
In order to confront with adversarial attacks, it was sug-
gested to add the adversarial examples to the training process
and balance between them and the original images [15, 20].
Many subsequent works have tried to increase the strength of
training-time attacks to improve robustness [2, 8, 9, 12, 22].
A different approach to overcome adversarial attacks is to
add randomization to the neural network [25, 26], making it
harder for the attacker to evaluate the gradients and thus to
exploit the vulnerability of the network. Recently, He et al.
[7] proposed to add Gaussian noise to the weights and activa-
tion of the network and showed improvement over ”vanilla”
adversarial training under various attacks.
In this paper, we propose a generalization of parametric
noise injection (PNI) [7] which we henceforth term paramet-
ric colored noise injection (CNI). The main idea is to replace
the independent noise with low-rank multivariate Gaussian
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noise. We show that this modification provides consistent
accuracy improvement under various attacks on a number of
datasets.
2. Method
In this section we introduce the proposed method of col-
ored noise injection for adversarial defence (CNI). The pre-
viously proposed PNI [7] has much in common with uncor-
related variational dropout [10], a powerful regularization
technique. In both methods, the noise is distributed as:
 ∼ N (0,Λ), (1)
for a diagonal N ×N matrix Λ = Diag(λ). Both methods
optimize the parameters λ during training. The difference
between two methods lies in their objective: while varational
dropout attempts to infer the Bayesian posterior, PNI makes
use of adversarial training to optimize the trade-off between
the clean (unperturbed) and adversarial accuracy. In the
adversarial training scheme, lowering the noise strength min-
imizes the clean loss, while increasing the strength provides
a defense from adversarial attacks, thereby minimizing the
adversarial loss.
Kingma et al. [10] have studied the addition of both cor-
related and uncorrelated random noise to the weights, claim-
ing dropout [19] is a particular case of such additive noise.
Specifically, the advantage of correlated noise over uncor-
related one was demonstrated. Nonetheless, He et al. [7]
have only considered the addition of uncorrelated noise. We
therefore consider a generalization of PNI which is based on
colored (correlated) noise. We model such noise using the
multivariate normal distribution with a low-rank covariance.
For an N -dimensional noise vector, the noise with an M -ran
covarianceis distributed as
 ∼ N (0,Σ), (2)
where
Σ = Λ + V V >, (3)
where Λ is an N ×N non-negative diagonal matrix, and V
is an N ×M matrix. Note that PNI is a particular case of
CNI with M = 0. The off-diagonal part of the covariance
matrix, V V >, is a general positive semi-definite symmetric
matrix with the rank upper-bounded by M representing a
low-dimensional interaction between different parameters.
Sampling low-rank multivariate normal noise In order
to sample the noise, we make use of the decomposition of
the covariance matrix Σ = Λ + V V >. We sample two
independent normal vectors,
D, C ∼ N (0, IN ), (4)
and let
 = Λ
1/2D + V C . (5)
Table 1: Comparison of our method (CNI) to PNI [7] using
various configurations on CIFAR-10 with ResNet20 under
PGD attack with k = 7 iterations. Mean and standard devia-
tion are calculated over 10 runs in our experiments (upper
half), and over 5 runs in the experiments by He et al. [7]
(lower half). Noise is injected either to the weights (“W”) or
the output activations (“A-a”). Best results for PNI and CNI
are set in bold.
Method Accuracy, mean±std%
Clean PGD
Adversarial training[15] 83.84± 0.05 39.14± 0.05
PNI-W 82.84± 0.22 46.11± 0.43
CNI-W 78.48± 0.41 48.84± 0.55
CNI-A-a 83.41± 0.14 45.47± 0.18
CNI-W+A-a 77.07± 0.40 46.07± 0.45
PNI-W 84.89± 0.11 45.94± 0.11
PNI-W+A-a 85.12± 0.10 43.57± 0.12
Table 2: Comparison of our method to prior art against black-
box attacks on CIFAR-10, ResNet-20 under transferable
PGD attack and NAttack [11]. † denotes our evaluation
of the code provided by authors or our re-implementation
thereof.
Method Accuracy,%
Transferable attack NAttack
Adv. training [15] † 58.8 33.17
PNI-W [7] † 54.6 47.17
CNI-W (our) 54.1 48.91
Weight decay We noted that for WideResNet the noise
strength increases significantly as compared to ResNet. This
leads to very slow convergence and lower performance of the
resulting model. To overcome this phenomenon, we added
an additional weight decay term to the elements of V . While
this approach leads to faster covergence and competitive
results on both clean and adversarial datasets, it introduces
an additional hyperparameter that requires some tuning.
3. Experiments
Experimental settings. We trained ResNet-20 defended
with CNI for 400 epochs on CIFAR-10 using SGD with the
learning rate 0.1, reduced by 10 at epochs 200 and 300, and
weight decay 10−4. The number of iteration of the PGD for
adversarial training was set to k = 7. In our experiments
we chose rank M = 5 for the colored noise factor. In
Section 3.1 we show the effect of different values of M to
the final accuracy. We have not studied other distributions
Table 3: Comparison of our method to prior art on CIFAR-
10 with WideResNet-28-4 under PGD attack with k = 10.
Mean and standard deviation are calculated over 10 runs
in our experiments, and over 2 runs in MMA. † denotes
our evaluation of the code provided by authors or our re-
implementation thereof. + denotes our evaluation based on
the checkpoint provided by the authors. We also provide
results for a larger (WideResNet-34-10) network in the lower
part of the table.
Method Accuracy, mean±std%
Clean PGD
Adv. training [15]† 86.08± 0.00 38.58± 0.06
MMA [5] 86.24± 0.13 54.86± 1.16
PNI [7]† 84.63± 0.15 53.34± 0.29
CNI-W (our) 84.42± 0.28 55.76± 0.29
IAAT [2] 91.3 48.53
TRADES [23]+ 84.92 56.5
MART [23]+ 83.62 57.3
Table 4: Comparison of our method to prior art on CIFAR-
100 with WideResNet-28-4 under PGD attack with k = 10.
Mean and standard deviation is calculated over 10 runs. †
denotes our evaluation of the code provided by authors or
our re-implementation thereof. + denotes our evaluation
based on the checkpoint provided by the authors. We also
provide results for a larger (WideResNet-34-10) network in
the lower part of the table.
Method Accuracy, mean±std%
Clean PGD
Adv. training [15]† 56.60± 0.00 16.71± 0.04
PNI [7]† 54.03± 0.37 23.67± 0.33
CNI-W (our) 53.65± 0.25 25.03± 0.21
IAAT [2] 68.1 26.17
L2L [8] 60.95± 0.13 31.03± 0.50
except the multivariate normal.
For WideResNet-28-4, we used the Ranger optimizer
(RAdam [13] with lookahead [24]) for 100 epochs, with the
learning rate 0.1, reduced by 10 at epochs 75 and 90, weight
decay 10−4 and additional weight decay of 10−3 for CIFAR-
10 and 3 · 10−3 for CIFAR-100 for the elements of V . The
number of iteration of the PGD for adversarial training was
set to k = 10. In all cases, the model with highest accuracy
on a clean validation set was chosen for the evaluation.
White box attacks. We evaluate our defense against PGD
attack [15] with same number of iterations as used in ad-
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Figure 1: Accuracy of CNI-W model under PGD attack
with different noise covariance rank. Shaded region shows
standard deviation of the results calculated over 50 runs.
versarial training (k = 7 for ResNet-20 and k = 10 for
WideResNet-28-4). The results are reported in Tables 1, 3
and 4. CNI outperforms other methods using WideResNet-
28-4 and shows compatible results even when compared
with methods which use larger networks.
Black box attacks. We evaluated the proposed method
against two common black-box attacks, in particular, the
transferable attack [14] and NAttack[11]. For the transfer-
able attack, we trained another instance of the CNI-W model
and used it as a source model in two configurations: PGD
with and without smoothing. The results are reported in
Table 2. For the transferable attack, our method achieve
comparable results to previous art and outperforms them on
NAttack.
3.1. Ablation study
We study the dependence of the network performance
on noise rank. The results are shown in Fig. 1. As we
can see, coloring the noise gives significant improvement
of adversarial accuracy, while too high rank of the noise
reduces the accuracy, probably due to overparametrization.
We also study the adversarial accuracy as a function of 
and k (Figs. 2 and 3). Fig. 3 shows that CNI has relatively
low variance of the results at small number of iterations, and
converges to approximately 33% accuracy for large k. As
expected, larger attack radius breaks the defence, and for
 = 24/255 the performance of the network is worse than
random. These results are consistent with the experiments
in He et al. [7] and confirm that noise injection leads to
true increased robustness of the network rather than to mere
gradient obfuscation [1].
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Figure 2: Accuracy of CNI-W model under PGD attack with
different attack radius,  (255 scale). Shaded region shows
standard deviation of the results calculated over 5 runs.
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Figure 3: Accuracy of CNI-W model under PGD attack
with different number of iterations, k. Shaded region shows
standard deviation of the results calculated over 5 runs.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we proposed to inject low-rank colored
multi-variate Gaussian noise to the parameters of a CNN
during adversarial training. We show that adding covari-
ance terms to the injected noise provides improvement over
independent noise [7] on both white- and black-box at-
tacks. Moreover, even though we used a much smaller
architecture (WideResNet-28-4), we achieved results com-
patible with state-of-the-art adversarial defences, which used
WideResNet-34-10. We also performed an ablation study of
the method hyperparameter (noise rank) as well as the attack
strength ( and k).
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